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IS THIS GOING TO BE ON THE TEST? RECONCILING THE FOUR-
WAY CIRCUIT SPLIT 
OVER HANDLING NOMINATIVE FAIR USE 
Christian Ferlan* 
Nominative fair use quietly allows the media to name sports 
teams, musical groups, and other trademarked sources in their 
reports, for the most part, without liability for infringement. 
Consumers rely on nominative fair use to make efficient 
purchasing decisions. It allows consumers to research and find 
third-party reviews directly naming and comparing brands. 
Without nominative fair use, consumers would have to rely on 
descriptions of competing products not having the benefit of source 
identifying marks. Producers rely on nominative fair use to 
compare their products to those of competitors as well as to 
describe certain qualities of their products. The United States 
Circuit Courts of Appeals disagree on how to determine whether a 
nominative use of another’s mark is a nominative fair use or an 
infringement. The Second Circuit in International Information 
Systems Security Certification Consortium v. Security University 
created an eleven-part inquiry into nominative fair use. This 
Recent Development argues that the Second Circuit should have 
instead seized the opportunity to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s simpler 
three-part test for nominative fair use. 
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I. INTRODUCTION—FAIR USE AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
Similar to the way the trademarked Apple logo gives 
consumers information about the product bearing the mark such as 
its price, ease of use, and source,1 certification marks expressly 
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2018. 
1 See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 
1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (first quoting Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 
1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993); and then 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12.01 (3d ed. 1992)) (“A mark answers the buyer’s 
questions ‘Who are you?’ ‘Where do you come from?’ ‘Who vouches for you?’ 
But the [generic] name of the product answers the question ‘What are you?’”); 
Apple Trademark List, APPLE, INC., http://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-
property/trademark/appletmlist.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
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serve to tell consumers that the product or service has a certain 
“regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, 
accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or 
services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was 
performed by members of a union or other organization.”2 Without 
certification marks consumers would not know if their groceries 
are actually organic,3 or if the person a business hires to protect its 
data knows how to develop a security program.4 
Because someone other than the owner uses a certification 
mark,5 owners have a greater interest in controlling how consumers 
see the mark.6 Likewise, users have an interest in controlling how 
                                                
 2 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2012). See, e.g., ENERGY STAR certification for your 
building, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
https://www.energystar.gov/buildings/facility-owners-and-managers/existing-
buildings/earn-recognition/energy-star-certification (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) 
(explaining the qualifications for ENERGY STAR certification and what the 
ENERGY STAR certification mark tells consumers—whatever is bearing the 
mark is “an energy–efficient top performer that saves money without sacrificing 
performance”); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1306.05(j) (2016), 
https://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current#/current/ch1300_d22670_21150_
d.html (showing examples of geographic certification marks including the 
“Grown in Idaho” mark printed in a silhouette of the state of Idaho that “certifies 
that goods identified by the mark are grown in Idaho and that the goods conform 
to quality, grade and other requirements, pursuant to standards designated by the 
Applicant”). 
 3 See AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., Organic Standards, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/grades-standards/organic-standards (last visited Sept. 
30, 2016). 
 4 See Certified Information Systems Security Professional, INT’L INFO. SYS. 
SEC. CERTIFICATION CONSORTIUM, https://www.isc2.org/cissp/default.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 5 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
 6 See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 
823 F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of 
Am., 104 F.3d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1997)) (“‘[I]t is important for a consumer to 
recognize the marks of the certification agencies that he trusts,’” and discussing 
whether the alleged infringing mark is ‘confusingly similar’ to the plaintiffs’ 
mark.”); see also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark 
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1916 (2007) (“Producers are able to frame 
just about any argument for broader protection in terms of consumer 
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competitors display the mark to keep the playing field level.7 When 
users display the mark exactly as it is registered, consumers can 
determine its exact meaning.8 However, when some users alter the 
appearance of the mark or add adjectives to set their products and 
services apart,9 consumers get a false impression that the user’s 
products or services meet a different, higher standard than 
competitors do.10 
Normally, use of another’s mark or something close to it brings 
a “likelihood of confusion” inquiry.11 However, when the user has 
little or no choice but to employ another’s mark to describe the 
user’s products or services,12 users are protected under the “fair 
use” defense as long as the mark is used descriptively rather than 
for its normal purpose of source identification.13 In addition, the 
                                                                                                         
expectations, which they are in position to influence systematically through 
marketing.”). 
 7 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767–68 (1992) 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012)) (“The Lanham Act was intended to make 
‘actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks’ and ‘to protect persons 
engaged in commerce . . . against unfair competition.’”); see also Michael S. 
Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of Values 
and Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427 (2011). 
 8 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
 9 For example, adding “super” to the “Organic” certification mark, falsely 
leading consumers to believe that the product bearing “Super Organic” is more 
organic than a product with the “Organic” certification mark. See cf Sec. Univ., 
823 F.3d at 157 (condemning defendant’s use of “Master” with plaintiff’s 
certification mark as if to indicate that the certification could be mastered and 
plaintiff offered this higher certification). 
 10 See id. at 158. 
 11 See generally, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 
495 (2d Cir. 1961) (laying out a list of eight non-exclusive factors that courts 
should consider when determining whether one mark is too similar to another 
mark such that consumers could be confused or misled as to the relationship 
between the marks and the users); see also Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 159—60 
(quoting Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 
1997)) (“[c]ertification marks are generally treated the same as trademarks for 
purposes of trademark law”). 
 12 See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 
(9th Cir. 1969) (permitting a business to use a registered trademark, the VW 
symbol, to describe its services, fixing Volkswagens). 
 13 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012); KP Permanent Make-Up Inc. v. Lasting 
Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114 (2004). 
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Ninth Circuit developed the doctrine of nominative fair use, which 
allows businesses to use another’s mark to refer to the mark 
owner’s products or services.14 Both fair use and nominative fair 
use promote competition because the “likelihood of confusion” 
factors15 tend to weigh in favor of restricting use simply because 
the user has no choice but to employ another’s mark.16 
Certification marks fit neatly into nominative fair use because 
by definition the mark must be “used by a person other than its 
owner.”17 Moreover, in the same way a nominative use of a 
trademark refers to its owner’s goods or services, certification 
marks are used to refer to the mark owner’s standard for certain 
qualities or characteristics of the product or service bearing the 
mark.18 In addition, an independent nominative fair use test 
promotes judicial efficiency by eliminating discussion of 
contextually erroneous factors and focusing on the defendant’s 
need to use the mark and whether the defendant misrepresented the 
plaintiff’s relation to the use.19 The Ninth Circuit controlled for 
                                                
 14 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 
304–06 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing newspapers to use the New Kids on the Block 
trademark in a poll, likening such use to a local newspaper being able to name 
the Chicago Bulls in a recap of the previous night’s game rather than requiring 
authors to say “the professional basketball team from Chicago”). 
 15 See infra Part II. Section B. (explaining in part that the verbiage of factors 
will differ depending on the jurisdiction but the inquiry is essentially the same); 
see also BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN–SOURCE CASEBOOK, Part 
II: Trademark Infringement, 37 (3d ed. 2016), http://tmcasebook.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/BeebeTMLaw-3.0-Part-2-Infringement.pdf (showing a 
chart of each circuit’s likelihood of confusion factors, marking common factors 
and factors unique to individual circuits in part because the factor tests came out 
of single cases from which courts adapt their interpretations and applications of 
the individual factors). 
 16 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(describing the need to exclude “likelihood of confusion” factors as unnecessary 
and unfairly weighing in favor of restricting use). 
 17 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
 18 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (requiring certification marks to be registered 
for use by someone other than the owner to refer to the owner’s certification 
standards), with New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (giving businesses the 
ability to refer to the mark owner’s product or service). 
 19 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225 
(3d Cir. 2005) (discussing the need to consolidate parts of a likelihood of 
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such confusion by limiting the “likelihood of confusion” inquiry to 
considering how the mark is used and what alternatives are 
available to the user.20 However, since 1992 when the Ninth Circuit 
introduced the doctrine, circuits have split over how exactly they 
should approach the issue, the Third Circuit split in 2005,21 and the 
Second Circuit split in 2016.22 
In 2005, the Third Circuit created the circuit split by rejecting 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision to replace the “likelihood of 
confusion” analysis with a three-part test for nominative fair use.23 
Instead, the Third Circuit adopted a broader, bifurcated approach 
that made nominative fair use an affirmative defense, giving 
defendants the opportunity to prevail even if the plaintiff proves 
“likelihood of confusion.”24 It did, however, shorten the potentially 
extensive analysis by instructing district courts to review only the 
                                                                                                         
confusion inquiry in a nominative fair use context); see also 4 MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2016) (“The Ninth 
Circuit, in crafting a separate category of a ‘nominative fair use’ analysis, 
created a specialized tool to analyze a certain class of cases of alleged 
infringement. In that class of cases, there may be a competitive need to use 
another’s trademark to identify the plaintiff in a way that is not likely to confuse 
customers.”). 
 20 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (“First, the product or service 
in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; 
second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably 
necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing 
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement 
by the trademark holder.”). 
 21 See id. at 304; see also Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“Today we adopt a two-step approach in nominative fair use cases.”). 
 22 See generally Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. 
Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 23 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002)) 
(stating that the New Kids on the Block test “better evaluates the likelihood of 
confusion in nominative [fair] use cases”). 
 24 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 222 (giving broader protections for 
nominative fair use than the Ninth Circuit grants under New Kids by allowing a 
defendant to prevail despite a plaintiff proving “likelihood of confusion”). 
DEC 2016] Handling Nominative Fair Use 39 
relevant “likelihood of confusion” factors in nominative fair use 
cases.25 
Most recently, the Second Circuit deepened the split.26 The 
Second Circuit held that nominative fair use is not an affirmative 
defense, but constructed a similar standard to that of the Third 
Circuit.27 Now, district courts in the Second Circuit must 
deliberately review each of the eight “likelihood of confusion” 
factors, and then discuss the Ninth Circuit’s three-part nominative 
fair use test, creating an eleven-step review for nominative fair use 
claims.28 
Part II of this Article examines the statutory basis of trademark 
rights and the limits that courts have placed on those rights through 
developing “fair use” doctrines along with the issues courts have 
faced along the way.29 Part III then compares the standards set by 
the Ninth, Third, and Second Circuits for the doctrine of 
nominative fair use, discussing the rationale for each decision and 
effects on future litigation.30 Part IV argues that the Second 
Circuit’s new approach runs contrary to the doctrine because the 
mark is created for the defendant’s use, which makes multiple 
“likelihood of confusion” factors consistently inapplicable.31 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit test that district courts in the Second 
                                                
 25 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 225–26 (asking future courts only to 
examine relevant factors). 
 26 See generally Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d 153 (overruling the Second Circuit’s 
district courts’ established practice of using the Ninth Circuit’s three-part test, 
substituting an eleven-part analysis). 
 27 See id. at 167–68 (describing the Third Circuit method, then laying out the 
approach for future Second Circuit cases). 
 28 See id. at 168 (requiring future courts to evaluate every “likelihood of 
confusion” factor including those that do not apply, explaining why they do not 
apply, before moving to the nominative fair use test). 
 29 Infra Part II. Section A. 
 30 Infra Parts III., IV. 
 31 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1054, 1127 (2012); see also Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 168 
(requiring review of every factor despite the fact that “similarity of the marks,” 
“strength of the mark,” and “proximity of the products and their competitiveness 
with one another” will weigh in favor of the plaintiff when the whole point of a 
certification mark is for another’s use, and nominative fair use is the defendant 
describing the plaintiff’s product). 
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Circuit had been using for at least ten years32 will save judicial 
resources by focusing opinions on relevant factors.33 Further, a 
uniform test will help users and potential litigants make rational 
decisions based on an established legal standard and reduce 
litigation costs that result from briefing and litigating eleven issues 
– some irrelevant – rather than just three.34 
II. TRADEMARK AND CERTIFICATION MARK LAW 
American trademark law grew out of English law in which 
guilds required members to display the guild’s mark on products in 
order to cultivate goodwill for the guild.35 In general, trademarks 
are source identifiers.36 As it stands today, the purpose of 
trademark law is to protect consumers from deception and 
encourage competition among producers.37 By giving producers 
                                                
 32 See generally Car–Freshner Corp. v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 
167, 177–78 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Audi AG v. Shokan Coachworks, Inc., 592 F. 
Supp. 2d 246, 269–70 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases); Yurman Studio, Inc. 
v. Castaneda, 591 F. Supp. 2d 471, 500–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); M. Shanken 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cigar500.com, No. 07 CIV. 7371(JGK), 2008 WL 2696168, 
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2008); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, 
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 33 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 
(1992); see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (2002) 
(making the three nominative fair use factors from New Kids the only factors to 
consider in nominative fair use cases). 
 34 See generally William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 
90 B.U. L. REV. 2267 (2010) (describing the financial considerations of 
litigating a nominative fair use dispute); compare New Kids on the Block, 971 
F.2d at 308, and Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151 (making the three nominative fair use 
factors from New Kids the only factors to consider in nominative fair use cases), 
with Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 168 (laying out eleven factors for future courts to 
consider in every case involving nominative fair use). 
 35 BEEBE, supra note 15, Introduction at 3–4. 
 36 Basic Facts: Trademarks, Patents, and Copyrights, U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-
started/trademark-basics/trademark-patent-or-copyright (last visited Nov. 1, 
2016). 
 37 See generally McKenna, supra note 6; see also BEEBE, supra note 15, 
Introduction at 19 (describing trademarks as a “merchandising short–cut” that 
allow consumers to make quick, rational purchasing decisions and give 
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limited property rights38 in the marks they use to distinguish their 
products or services from competitors, the law assures consumers 
that when they look for a new cell phone, the phones with an apple 
on the back come from Apple, not Samsung or Google.39 At the 
same time, the law encourages producers to invest in the quality of 
their products or services to develop a positive reputation among 
consumers knowing that competitors cannot profit off of the 
goodwill associated with their trademark.40 This section will 
explore in more detail (A) the statutory authority for trademark 
claims; (B) the common law approaches to analyzing trademark 
claims; and (C) the development of fair use doctrines, specifically 
nominative fair use. 
A. Statutory Authority 
The Lanham Act41 lays the foundation on which courts have 
built the body of trademark law.42 The Lanham Act protects 
owners of trademarks from unauthorized use and misuse of their 
marks to preserve the integrity and value of the mark for the 
                                                                                                         
producers the opportunity to influence the minds of consumers through verbal, 
auditory, visual, and olfactory associations in advertising their marks). 
 38 See McKenna, supra note 6, at 1840 (“Significantly, this approach did not 
generate broad and absolute rights in a trademark. Instead, courts traditionally 
protected the exclusive right to use a trademark only within a particular field of 
trade and as against direct competitors.”); see infra Part II. Section C. 
 39 McKenna, supra note 6, at 1844 (“By preserving the integrity of these 
symbols, trademark law benefits consumers in both a narrow sense (by 
protecting them from being deceived into buying products they do not want) and 
a broad sense (by allowing consumers to rely on source indicators generally and 
thereby reducing the costs of searching for products in the market).”). 
 40 Id. at 1856 (“Likewise in Hogg v. Kirby, the Chancery Court intervened 
because it considered the publication by the defendant of what appeared to be a 
continuation of plaintiff’s magazine a fraud upon the goodwill of the plaintiff’s 
periodical.”). 
 41 The Lanham Act is the main federal statute governing trademark law, 
laying the framework for what can be registered, what rights are associated with 
registration, what are competitors’ rights, and how those rights are violated. See 
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)–(e) (2002); see also Overview of Trademark Law, 
HARVARD LAW, https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 42 See KP Permanent Make–Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 
111, 121, (2004). 
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owner, along with the relationship that the owner has built with 
consumers.43 A successful claim of certification mark infringement 
requires two showings: first, that the mark merits protection, and 
second, that the defendant’s use of the mark or a similar mark is 
likely to cause confusion.44 
When unauthorized entities use a trademark or authorized 
entities misuse a trademark, the owner can sue for infringement in 
order to protect the integrity and value of the mark for the owner 
and its reputation amongst consumers.45 Although trademarks are 
used as source identifiers,46 infringing use of the mark is not 
limited to confusion about the source.47 Likelihood of confusion as 
to the mark owner’s sponsorship, connection, affiliation, or 
approval of the defendant’s use will also give rise to an 
infringement claim.48 
For example, the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ uniforms are a 
trademark of the organization.49 In 1978, Pussycat Cinema Ltd. 
produced and showed its movie, “Debbie Does Dallas” telling the 
fictional story of Debbie, a girl chosen to become a “Texas 
Cowgirl” cheerleader, who had to perform sexual acts in order to 
pay for her travel expenses to get to Dallas.50 During the film, 
                                                
 43 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012) (defining infringement); see also McGeveran, 
supra note 34, at 2277 (“Brand managers and their trademark attorneys define 
their professional success by protecting and strengthening the value of [their 
marks].”). 
 44 Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 
2004); see, e.g., Am. Angus Ass’n v. Sysco Corp., 829 F. Supp. 807, 819 
(W.D.N.C. 1992) (enjoining defendant’s use of “Supreme Certified Angus 
Beef” as likely to cause confusion with plaintiff’s [registered] certification 
“Certified Angus Beef,” because “there [was] almost a certainty that customers 
will be led to believe [Certified Angus Beef] has introduced a new line”). 
 45 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (imitation of registered mark), 1125 (false 
designation of origin) (2012). 
 46 Id. § 1127. 
 47 See id. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
 48 See id.; Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., 
LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 2016); 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2016). 
 49 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 
202 (2d Cir.1979). 
 50 Id. at 202–03. 
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Debbie is shown wearing a uniform very similar to that of the 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders while performing sexual acts.51 The 
Dallas Cowboys successfully sued, claiming that although viewers 
would probably not be confused as to whether the Dallas Cowboys 
were the source of the film, viewers were likely to be misled into 
believing that the Dallas Cowboys sponsored or otherwise 
approved of the use of the cheerleading uniform and, by 
association, Debbie’s chosen method of earning the uniform.52 
The owner of the mark does not have unlimited, irrefutable 
rights to control its use.53 The Lanham Act54 carves out exceptions 
that allow others to use the mark without authorization and free of 
liability.55 One such exception, “descriptive fair use” is a defense 
for the alleged infringement when the “term is used descriptively, 
not as a mark, fairly, and in good faith.”56 In other words, a 
business may use another’s mark to describe its own goods or 
services in good faith, as long as the use is not likely to confuse 
                                                
 51 Id. at 203 (“Defendants advertised the movie with marquee posters 
depicting Debbie in the allegedly infringing uniform and containing such 
captions as ‘Starring Ex Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader Bambi Woods’ and ‘You’ll 
do more than cheer for this X Dallas Cheerleader.’”). 
 52 Id. at 204–05 (“Appellants read the confusion requirement too narrowly. In 
order to be confused, a consumer need not believe that the owner of the mark 
actually produced the item and placed it on the market. The public’s belief that 
the mark’s owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark 
satisfies the confusion requirement.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 53 McKenna, supra note 6, at 1841. 
 54 See generally, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)–(e) (2012); see also Overview of 
Trademark Law, HARVARD LAW, 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited Sept. 
30, 2016). 
 55 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2012) (establishing defenses to trademark 
infringement); see also KP Permanent Make–Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 
Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121 (2004) (granting fair use as a defense to trademark 
infringement). 
 56 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124; see also KP Permanent Make-
Up, Inc., 543 U.S. at 112 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)) (“[U]se of the . . . 
term . . . charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, . . . of 
a term . . . which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to 
describe the goods or services.”). 
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consumers as to the source of the product or the mark owner’s 
sponsorship or affiliation with the product.57 
B. Common Law Addressing “Likelihood of Confusion” Inquiries 
Circuit courts generally agree over how to analyze whether 
there is a likelihood of confusion.58 In the Second Circuit, the 
Polaroid59 factors as articulated in Starbucks60 govern likelihood of 
confusion: 
(1) strength of the trademark; (2) similarity of the marks; 
(3) proximity of the products and their competitiveness 
with one another; (4) evidence that the senior user may 
“bridge the gap” by developing a product for sale in the 
market of the alleged infringer’s product; (5) evidence of 
actual consumer confusion; (6) evidence that the imitative 
mark was adopted in bad faith; (7) respective quality of the 
                                                
 57 See infra Part II Section C. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102 
(2d Cir. 2010) (“The doctrine of nominative fair use allows a defendant to use a 
plaintiff’s trademark to identify the plaintiff’s goods so long as there is no 
likelihood of confusion about the source of the defendant’s product or the mark–
holder’s sponsorship or affiliation.”) (alterations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 58 See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ. LLC, 
823 F.3d 153, 165 (2d Cir. 2016); see also, e.g., George & Co. LLC v. 
Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 393 (4th Cir. 2009) (laying out nine 
factors “(1) the strength or distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark as actually used 
in the marketplace; (2) the similarity of the two marks to consumers; (3) the 
similarity of the goods or services that the marks identify; (4) the similarity of 
the facilities used by the markholders; (5) the similarity of advertising used by 
the markholders; (6) the defendant’s intent; (7) actual confusion; (8) the quality 
of the defendant’s product; and (9) the sophistication of the consuming public”); 
Sabinsa Corp. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 609 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(listing ten factors); Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 
931 F.2d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir. 1991) (listing eight factors). 
 59 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 
1961) (“The problem of determining how far a valid trademark shall be 
protected with respect to goods other than those to which its owner has applied 
it, has long been vexing and does not become easier of solution with the 
years.”). 
 60 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
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products; and (8) sophistication of consumers in the 
relevant market.61 
The Polaroid factors, however, are not exclusive, and like 
other factor tests, a factor could be irrelevant to the claim.62 For 
example, the fourth factor, bridging the gap between the market in 
which the mark owner employs the mark and the market of the 
alleged infringer, is irrelevant when considering if a small coffee 
shop’s logo is confusingly similar to the iconic Starbucks mermaid 
logo because the two users operate in the same space.63 Likewise, 
discussing the “similarity of the marks” is unhelpful when 
Starbucks sues a newspaper for infringement claiming likelihood 
of confusion when the newspaper used the exact Starbucks logo in 
an article about complicated coffee orders.64 Applying the factors 
should not overshadow what the court ultimately seeks to answer: 
“Whether, looking at the products in their totality, consumers are 
likely to be confused.”65 
C. Nominative Fair Use 
Traditional fair use as a defense to trademark infringement is 
grounded in the Lanham Act.66 The provision protects defendants 
who use a name, term, or device “otherwise than as a mark, . . . 
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to 
describe the goods or services of such party.”67 The Supreme Court 
applied this provision in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting 
                                                
 61 Id. at 115. 
 62 Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 160 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arrow Fastener Co. v. 
Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384 (2d. Cir. 1995)) (“No single factor is dispositive, 
and cases may certainly arise where a factor is irrelevant to the facts at hand.”). 
 63 Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 115. 
 64 See cf. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d 302 (using the New Kids on the 
Block trade name in a newspaper article surveying readers about who their 
favorite member of the group is). 
 65 See Kelly–Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The 
application of the Polaroid test is not mechanical, but rather, focuses on the 
ultimate question of whether, looking at the products in their totality, consumers 
are likely to be confused.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) (listing what the Court has 
dubbed “fair use” among several defenses to infringement). 
 67 § 1115(b)(4). 
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Impression I, Inc.,68 allowing the defendant to use the plaintiff’s 
trademark “micro color” to describe the defendant’s cosmetic 
products.69 The Court found that “the defendant has no independent 
burden to negate the likelihood of any confusion in raising the 
affirmative defense that a term is used descriptively, not as a mark, 
and in good faith.”70 The Court, however, expressly declined to 
address the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of nominative fair use in this 
context, leaving it up to the circuits to shape the doctrine.71 
Nominative fair use differs slightly from traditional, descriptive 
fair use72 in that the non-owner uses the mark to describe the 
owner’s goods or services because there is no reasonably available 
word other than the mark.73 In other words, the non-owner uses the 
mark as a source identifier to refer to the product or service that it 
represents rather than using the mark to describe the non-owner’s 
own product.74 Nominative fair use gives businesses like car repair 
shops the ability to use names like Ford, Volkswagen, and Toyota 
in their advertising without infringing on the respective 
                                                
 68 543 U.S. 111 (2004). 
 69 See generally id. 
 70 Id. at 124 (emphasis added). 
 71 Id. at 115 n.3 (“The District Court’s findings as to the generic or descriptive 
nature of the term ‘micro color’ and any secondary meaning that term has 
acquired by any of the parties, are not before us. Nor are the Court of Appeals’s 
holdings on these issues. Nor do we address the Court of Appeals’s discussion 
of ‘nominative fair use.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 72 Descriptive fair use, grounded in the Lanham Act, allows parties other than 
the owner of the mark to use a mark to describe their own products or services. 
As a policy matter, fair use promotes competition by preventing businesses from 
monopolizing generic terms, thereby inhibiting other businesses from accurately 
describing and marketing their goods and services. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4); 
see also KP Permanent Make–Up, 543 U.S. at 123 (recognizing fair use as a 
defense to an infringement claim over a trademarked word that described the 
mark owner’s product and that the defendant needed to use to describe his own 
product). 
 73 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (illustrating the need for 
specialized categories of fair use). 
 74 See id. (“To be sure, this is not the classic fair use case where the defendant 
has used the plaintiff’s mark to describe the defendant’s own product. Here, the 
New Kids trademark is used to refer to the New Kids themselves.”) 
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manufacturers’ trademarks.75 There remains a possibility that 
consumers could be confused about a connection between the user 
of the mark and the owner of the mark simply because the use in 
question is the exact mark.76 The law tolerates this possibility as 
long as the user does not inaccurately imply connection with or 
sponsorship of the owner.77 The issue of how and where 
nominative fair use fits in trademark litigation remains a point of 
debate between the circuits.78 At the center of the debate is the role 
of the likelihood of confusion factors in the courts’ analyses.79 
Courts first disagree over whether the likelihood of confusion 
factors belong in the discussion at all.80 Second, courts disagree 
over whether the likelihood of confusion factors should be 
discussed in the same analysis as nominative fair use or separately, 
with nominative fair use being an affirmative defense.81 
                                                
 75 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 
1969). 
 76 See KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 121–22. 
 77 See id. (“The common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on 
the part of consumers followed from the very fact that in cases like this one an 
originally descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the 
undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a 
descriptive term simply by grabbing it first.”); see also New Kids on the Block, 
971 F.2d at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prestonettes, Inc. v. 
Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368, (1924)) (“When the mark is used in a way that does 
not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being 
used to tell the truth.”). 
 78 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(setting forth the Ninth Circuit’s position on the role of the likelihood of 
confusion factors); Century 21 Real Estate Corp v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 
211, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (making the nominative fair use analysis an affirmative 
defense, separate from the likelihood of confusion analysis); Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. 
Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ. LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 167 (2d Cir. 
2016) (adopting a new approach that adds the nominative fair use test to the end 
of the likelihood of confusion analysis). 
 79 See Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167–68. 
 80 See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150 (holding that the nominative fair use analysis 
replaces the likelihood of confusion analysis when relevant). 
 81 Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167–68 (explaining where the likelihood of 
confusion factors fit in the Third and Ninth Circuit analyses and why the Second 
Circuit is choosing to go in a different direction). 
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III. SO WHAT IS THE TEST? IT DEPENDS 
Circuit courts have struggled to define the proper analysis for 
nominative fair use.82 This section will provide greater detail as to 
the principles and rationale behind (A) the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
creating a nominative fair use test; (B) the Third Circuit’s decision 
making nominative fair use an affirmative defense; and (C) the 
Second Circuit’s recent decision, which borrows parts of the 
rationale from the Third and Ninth Circuits, fashioning an eleven-
part nominative fair use analysis. The balancing act between 
protecting the owner’s right to control use of the mark and other 
users’ interest in distinguishing their products and services from 
those of competitors has resulted in a four-way circuit split.83 In 
cases involving nominative fair use claims, the Ninth Circuit holds 
that the nominative fair use test replaces its test for likelihood of 
confusion.84 The Third Circuit evaluates nominative fair use as an 
affirmative defense, requiring a plaintiff to prove likelihood of 
confusion before shifting the burden to the defendant to 
nominative fair use.85 The First Circuit has “recognized the 
‘underlying principle’ of nominative fair use, but like several other 
circuits, [the First Circuit has] never endorsed any particular 
version of the doctrine.”86 Likewise, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits have recognized the doctrine of nominative fair 
use, but have either declined to adopt a formal standard or relied 
                                                
 82 Compare Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 220 (paralleling nominative 
fair use to classic fair use in terms of its place in the Lanham Act’s enumerated 
defenses), with Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167 (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision to make nominative fair use a separate inquiry from traditional 
likelihood of confusion followed by affirmative defenses because nominative 
fair use does not exactly fit the definition of “fair use” under the Lanham Act). 
 83 See Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 166 (listing each circuit’s principal case for 
nominative fair use and adding parenthetical information describing differences 
among the tests). 
 84 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 85 See generally Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d 211. 
 86 Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44, 50 (1st 
Cir. 2013); see also Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 
424 (1st Cir. 2007) (“This court has not previously decided whether to endorse 
the Ninth Circuit’s test for nominative fair uses, and we have no occasion to do 
so here. We have, however, recognized the underlying principle.”). 
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only on likelihood of confusion factors in nominative fair use 
cases.87 
A. Where the Debate Started—The Ninth Circuit  
Judge Kozinski, writing for the Ninth Circuit, initiated the 
debate about nominative fair use in New Kids on the Block v. News 
America Publishing, Inc.,88 by allowing newspapers to use the 
trademark “New Kids on the Block” in a survey asking readers 
which member of the group was their favorite.89 In that case, the 
court had to answer whether such use was likely to confuse 
consumers as to the band’s association with the newspaper’s poll.90 
The court first addressed and dismissed a classic fair use inquiry 
because the defendant newspaper was using the mark to refer to 
the New Kids on the Block rather than to describe the defendant’s 
own product as classic fair use requires.91 In holding that the 
                                                
 87 Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 155 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We 
hasten to add that we are not adopting a position about the viability of the 
nominative fair-use doctrine as a defense to trademark infringement or whether 
this doctrine should formally alter our likelihood-of-confusion test in some way. 
That question has not been presented here and we leave it for another day.”); Bd. 
of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 
550 F.3d 465, 489 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Although the alleged nominative fair use 
should usually be considered along with the likelihood–of–confusion analysis, 
we have declined to require any particular method for the consideration in cases 
where the nominative use is not a significant factor in the liability determination. 
We think this is such a case.”); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 
F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) abrogated on other grounds by KP Permanent 
Make–Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004) (“This circuit 
has never followed the nominative fair use analysis, always having applied the 
Frisch’s Restaurants test. We are not inclined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis here. Even if we were to do so, TeleScan’s use of PACCAR’s 
trademarks does not fall within the nominative fair use defense.”); Aug. Storck 
K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A use of a rival’s mark 
that does not engender confusion about origin or quality is therefore 
permissible.”) (citation omitted). 
 88 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 89 Id. at 304 (describing the newspapers’ surveys asking “[w]hich one of the 
New Kids is the most popular” and “[w]ho is the best on the block?”). 
 90 Id. at 308. 
 91 See id. (“If the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark refers to 
something other than the plaintiff’s product, the traditional fair use inquiry will 
continue to govern.”) 
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newspaper made a “non-infringing nominative use of the mark,”92 
the court developed the following test for nominative fair use: 
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily 
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of 
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to 
identify the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing 
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.93 
The Ninth Circuit has reasoned that the traditional test for 
likelihood of confusion fit poorly with nominative fair use cases94 
and that its version of the Polaroid factors testing likelihood of 
confusion95 could not account for the inherent confusion in a 
nominative use.96 Because of the poor fit, the test from New Kids 
on the Block later replaced the Ninth Circuit’s “likelihood of 
confusion” factors for nominative fair use cases.97 The court held 
in favor of the defendant newspaper, finding that the defendant did 
not do anything to indicate that the New Kids on the Block 
sponsored its polls.98 
                                                
 92 Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ. LLC, 823 
F.3d 153, 165 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New 
Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 304). 
 93 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
 94 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 95 See generally AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 
1979) abrogated in part on other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain 
Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that the Sleekcraft factors 
were replaced by the New Kids on the Block test in instances of nominative fair 
use); see also JL Beverage Co., LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098, 
1106 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[O]ur court relies on the eight–factor Sleekcraft test.”). 
 96 See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151 (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 
F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002)) (stating that the New Kids on the Block test 
“better evaluates the likelihood of confusion in nominative [fair] use cases”). 
 97 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308; Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150—51. 
 98 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (“It is no more reasonably possible, 
however, to refer to the New Kids as an entity than it is to refer to the Chicago 
Bulls, Volkswagens, or the Boston Marathon without using the trademark.”). 
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B. The Bifurcated Approach—The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit weighed in on nominative fair use in Century 
21 Real Estate Corp v. Lendingtree, Inc.99 At the time, few cases 
other than those from the Ninth Circuit had addressed nominative 
fair use.100 The Third Circuit took the opportunity to examine and 
reject the Ninth Circuit approach that replaced the likelihood of 
confusion factors with the nominative fair use test.101 Instead, the 
Third Circuit made nominative fair use an affirmative defense that 
is addressed after the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of 
likelihood of confusion.102 
In Century 21, the defendant advertised access to real estate 
agents, price comparison tools, and mortgage providers on its 
website, naming several companies including Century 21.103 
Century 21 sued, claiming that the defendant improperly 
referenced Century 21’s trademarked services and that consumers 
were likely to be confused as to whether Century 21 was affiliated 
with the defendant’s advertisements.104 The defendant responded 
asserting nominative fair use.105 
Until Century 21, the Third Circuit had not formally 
recognized nominative fair use, although its district courts had 
encountered parties making the claim.106 Seeing the difficulties 
faced by district courts applying the traditional likelihood of 
confusion test together with nominative fair use,107 the Third 
Circuit took the opportunity to recognize the doctrine formally and 
                                                
 99 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 100 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
 101 Id. at 222. 
 102 Id. (following its interpretation of the rationale in KP Permanent that made 
descriptive fair use an affirmative defense under the Lanham Act, making 
nominative fair use an affirmative defense allowing a defendant broader 
protections for nominative uses with no burden to negate the plaintiff’s showing 
of likelihood of confusion). 
 103 Id. at 214–15. 
 104 Id. at 215. 
 105 Id. at 214. 
 106 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 218. 
 107 Id. at 219 (acknowledging the poor fit of the likelihood of confusion 
factors with nominative fair uses). 
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“clarify the proper analysis in this area of the law.”108 The Third 
Circuit based its analysis on the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in KP Permanent Make-Up.109 The Supreme Court applied the 
statutory fair use defense that permits “use of the [trademarked] 
name, term, or device charged to be an infringement . . . otherwise 
than as a mark.”110 The Third Circuit also agreed with the Ninth 
Circuit in adopting a separate analysis for nominative fair use 
“because [the Third Circuit’s] traditional likelihood of confusion 
test does not apply neatly to nominative fair use cases.”111 
However, the Third Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit on 
how nominative fair use fits in the analysis.112 The Third Circuit 
declined to draw the distinction between the statutory descriptive 
fair use defense and nominative fair use, and in doing so, made 
nominative fair use an affirmative defense.113 The question of 
confusion in descriptive fair use cases revolves around the 
defendant’s use of a term “descriptively, not as a mark, fairly, and 
in good faith.”114 On the other hand, a nominative fair use employs 
the term as a mark not to describe the defendant’s product or 
service, but to refer to the plaintiff’s product or service.115 Under 
the Third Circuit’s new scheme in nominative fair use cases, the 
plaintiff still bears the initial burden of proving likelihood of 
confusion.116 Then, even if the plaintiff carries this burden, the 
                                                
 108 Id. at 219. 
 109 543 U.S. 111, 124 (2004); Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 220–21. 
 110 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012). But see KP Permanent Make–Up, 543 U.S. 
at 115 n.3 (noting the Court’s decision not to address nominative fair use “[a]fter 
finding that Lasting had conceded that KP used the term only to describe its 
goods and not as a mark,” because the statutory affirmative defense of 
descriptive fair use fits this type of use). 
 111 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 222. 
 112 See id. at 223 (elaborating on the decision to parallel classic fair use and 
nominative fair use). 
 113 Id. 
 114 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124. 
 115 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 220–21. 
 116 Id. at 223. 
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defendant can prevail despite the court finding a likelihood of 
confusion by satisfying the three-part nominative fair use test.117 
In the interest of fairness to defendants, the Third Circuit 
recognized that “the likelihood of confusion test does not lend 
itself nicely to a nominative fair use fact pattern.”118 It chose to 
eliminate two factors completely because “applied mechanically 
[the factors] would inevitably point towards likelihood of 
confusion where no likelihood of confusion may actually exist.”119 
The court instructed future courts faced with nominative fair use 
claims to address only the relevant likelihood of confusion factors, 
rather than all of the factors that do not inherently, unfairly point 
towards likelihood of confusion.120 Going forward, a plaintiff 
would have to meet its burden on likelihood of confusion, after 
which a defendant would have the burden of satisfying the Third 
Circuit’s modified nominative fair use inquiry by answering the 
following questions: 
Is the use of plaintiff’s mark necessary to describe [] plaintiff’s 
product or service and [] defendant’s product or service? Is only so 
much of the plaintiff’s mark used as is necessary to describe the 
plaintiff’s products or services? Does the defendant’s conduct or 
language reflect the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff 
and defendant’s products or services?121 
To this point, the Third Circuit stands alone in using this 
approach.122 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit’s iteration of the Ninth 
                                                
 117 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
 118 Id. at 224 (“Thus, we must tailor the test and measure only those factors 
that are meaningful and probative in the context of nominative fair use.”). 
 119 Id. at 224–25 (“[T]he first two Lapp factors would indicate a likelihood of 
confusion in a case such as this one simply because the mark is being employed 
in a nominative manner. By way of example, looking at the similarity of the 
mark would automatically lead to the conclusion that the use is likely to confuse 
simply because the mark is not merely similar it is identical . . . . Looking at the 
strength of CCE’s marks in this case, and in most nominative use cases, would 
also weigh in favor of finding that the use is likely to confuse.”). 
 120 Id. at 224. 
 121 Id. at 228. 
 122 Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 
F.3d 153, 167 (2d Cir. 2016). But see Radiance Found. Inc. v. NAACP, 786 
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Circuit’s nominative fair use test could clear up some judicial 
uncertainty as to the types of confusion that courts should consider 
when analyzing nominative fair use.123 In particular the last 
question, asking whether “the defendant’s conduct or language 
reflects the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant’s products or services,” more fully describes the 
concerns that the Ninth Circuit’s third element addresses.124 The 
Second Circuit encountered this judicial uncertainty about the 
Ninth Circuit’s third nominative fair use element when a district 
court, applying the Ninth Circuit’s test, held “that the only type of 
confusion relevant to an infringement claim was confusion as to 
source.”125 However, this difference has yet to lead a court to the 
conclusion that the Third Circuit approach is preferable.126 
C. Splitting the Difference—The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit had its opportunity to weigh in on the 
matter in International Information Systems Security Certification 
Consortium, Inc. v. Security University, LLC,127 in which 
                                                                                                         
F.3d 316, 328—30 (4th Cir. 2015) (categorizing nominative fair use with 
descriptive fair use as an affirmative defense without citing language from 15 
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4), and not adopting a formal test for determining whether 
nominative fair use has been established); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, 
Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 155 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We . . . are not adopting a position 
about . . . whether [the nominative fair use] doctrine should formally alter our 
likelihood of confusion test in some way.”). 
 123 See infra Part III. Section C. (discussing the Second Circuit’s district judge 
considering only source confusion when the judge should have looked at 
affiliation, sponsorship, or approval confusion in addition to source). 
 124 See Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167 (holding that district courts are to consider 
the Ninth Circuit and Third Circuit’s nominative fair use factors, then continuing 
to combine the two versions of the test into one). Compare New Kids on the 
Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (1992) (“[T]hird, the user 
must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship 
or endorsement by the trademark holder.”), with Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. 
Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Does the defendant’s 
conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff 
and defendant’s products or services?”). 
 125 See Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 155—56. 
 126 See id. at 166 (citing circuit court opinions that have adopted variations of 
the Ninth Circuit test, not the Third Circuit test). 
 127 823 F.3d 153. 
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International Information Security Certification Consortium, Inc. 
(“ISC”) sued Security University (“SU”) alleging that SU’s use of 
ISC’s certification mark, CISSP® (“Certified Information Systems 
Security Professional”), constituted infringement under the 
Lanham Act.128 ISC registered its certification mark CISSP® for 
individuals who met ISC’s “requirements and standards of 
competency in the information security field, including passing the 
CISSP® certification examination that [ISC] administers.”129 
SU offers courses for information security training, including a 
course on taking the CISSP® exam.130 SU was allowed to use the 
CISSP® certification mark131 and promote its instructors as 
CISSP®-certified.132 In its advertisements, SU marketed one of its 
instructors as “Master CISSP® Clement Dupuis” or “CISSP 
Master Clement Dupuis.”133 ISC argued that use of “Master” before 
or after the certification mark improperly implies that the instructor 
held some higher certification that did not in fact exist, and 
consumers were likely to be confused.134 SU argued that its 
advertisements constituted nominative fair use.135 
The district court applied the New Kids on the Block factors 
and held for SU, finding that using “Master” was not likely to 
confuse consumers as to the source of the service that SU was 
selling, and thus SU’s use of the mark was a nominative fair use.136 
However, the district court failed to consider likelihood of 
                                                
 128 Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 155. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 156. 
 131 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (explaining that certification marks are 
intended for use by someone other than the owner of the mark). 
 132 Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 157. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See id. at 157; see also e.g. Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1881 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (“The Trademark Board held that the fact that 
applicant’s ‘Darjeeling Nouveau’ tea was, in all circumstances, made entirely of 
genuine, certified ‘Darjeeling’ tea, and merely purported to meet higher 
standards as the ‘first press,’ was irrelevant.”). 
 135 Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 158. 
 136 Id. at 158–59. 
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confusion over ISC’s sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of 
SU’s use of the mark.137 
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted this error, commenting, “it 
is hard to imagine a case in which use of a certification mark by a 
person who has met the requirements for certification would likely 
lead to confusion as to source or origin.”138 However, the court did 
not remand based on this error.139 Because the district courts in the 
Second Circuit had been applying the Ninth Circuit test,140 the 
Second Circuit took the opportunity to set its own method for 
future likelihood of confusion and nominative fair use cases.141 
Going forward, 
[w]hen considering a likelihood of confusion in nominative 
fair use cases, in addition to discussing each of the 
Polaroid factors, courts are to consider: (1) whether the use 
of the plaintiff’s mark is necessary to describe both the 
plaintiff’s product or service and the defendant’s product or 
service, that is, whether the product or service is not readily 
identifiable without use of the mark; (2) whether the 
defendant uses only so much of the plaintiff’s mark as is 
necessary to identify the product or service; and (3) 
whether the defendant did anything that would, in 
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the plaintiff holder, that is, whether the 
defendant’s conduct or language reflects the true or 
accurate relationship between plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
products or services.142 
                                                
 137 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012); see also Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 162. 
 138 Id. at 158–59. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See id. at 166 (citing district court opinions); see, e.g., Car–Freshner Corp. 
v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 167, 177–78 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Audi AG 
v. Shokan Coachworks, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 246, 269–70 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(collecting cases); Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, 591 F. Supp. 2d 471, 500–
02 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); M. Shanken Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cigar500.com, No. 07 CIV. 
7371(JGK), 2008 WL 2696168, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2008); Merck & Co. v. 
Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y.2006). 
 141 Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 168. 
 142 Id. at 168. 
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At this point, there are three distinct approaches for addressing 
nominative fair use claims, in addition to a group of circuits that 
have not formally adopted a nominative fair use test.143 However, 
in September of 2016, SU filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, 
asking the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split over 
nominative fair use.144 The International Trademark Association 
filed an amicus brief in October of 2016, urging the Court to 
answer “[w]hat the proper standard under the Lanham Act is for 
analyzing a defendant’s nominative use of a plaintiff’s 
trademark.”145 
IV. WHAT SHOULD BE THE TEST FOR NOMINATIVE FAIR 
USE? 
The following subsections argue that the Ninth Circuit test 
from New Kids on the Block that the Second Circuit endorsed in 
Security University is, alone, sufficient for resolving nominative 
fair use cases because (A) district courts had been successfully 
using the Ninth Circuit test,146 (B) the non-exclusive Polaroid 
factors do not easily apply to nominative fair use,147 and (C) an 
eleven-part analysis of nominative fair use is a waste of judicial 
                                                
 143 See Swavrovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44, 50 
(1st Cir. 2013) (recognizing “the ‘underlying principle’ of nominative fair use” 
without adopting a particular version of the test); see also Bd. of Supervisors for 
La. St. Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. V. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 488–
89 (5th Cir. 2008) (giving instructions to defendants who want to claim 
nominative fair use without stating whether the court will treat it as an 
affirmative defense but holding that “[i]n order to avail oneself of the 
nominative fair use defense ‘the defendant (1) may only use so much of the 
mark as necessary to identify the product or service and (2) may not do anything 
that suggests affiliation, sponsorship, or endorsement by the markholder’”). 
 144 Katie Howard, Security University, LLC v. International Information 
Systems Security Certification Consortium, Inc.; Pending Petition, 
SCOTUSBLOG, (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/security-university-llc-v-international-information-systems-security-
certification-consortium-inc/. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., 823 
F.3d 153, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing district court cases using the Ninth 
Circuit test). 
 147 See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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resources.148 The Second Circuit could have resolved Security 
University without addressing the issue of nominative fair use by 
remanding the case after finding that the district court failed to 
consider whether consumers could be confused as to ISC’s 
association with, or sponsorship of, SU’s use of “Master” next to 
the CISSP® mark.149 This would have allowed the Second Circuit 
to remain neutral on the issue of nominative fair use.150 
A. The Second Circuit Should Have Adopted the Ninth Circuit 
Nominative Fair Use Test that District Courts in the Second 
Circuit Had Been Using 
Before Security University, the Second Circuit had not 
instructed district courts to use either the Ninth or the Third 
Circuit’s rule on nominative fair use.151 However, the Second 
Circuit had acknowledged that the district court “[applied] the 
standard for non-trademark or ‘nominative’ fair use set forth by the 
Ninth Circuit in New Kids on the Block.”152 In addition, the district 
court from Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.,153 applied the Ninth 
Circuit test for nominative fair use.154 On appeal, the Second 
Circuit held that “a defendant may lawfully use a plaintiff’s 
trademark where doing so is necessary to describe the plaintiff’s 
product and does not imply a false affiliation or endorsement by 
the plaintiff of the defendant.”155 However, like the First Circuit’s 
                                                
 148 See generally McGeveran, supra note 34. 
 149 Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 162. 
 150 See id. at 166. 
 151 Id. (describing the holdings in prior cases including Tiffany (NJ) in which 
the Second Circuit did not overrule the district court’s use of the New Kids on 
the Block test, but did not formally hold that the Ninth Circuit test for 
nominative fair use is the proper standard going forward). 
 152 See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(remanding the for further fact finding on other instances of infringement); see 
also Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 166 (naming a laundry list of district court opinions 
that had used the New Kids on the Block test without reprimand or correction by 
the appellate court). 
 153 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); infra Part IV. Section A.1. 
 154 Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 102. 
 155 Compare Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 102–03, with New Kids on the Block, 
971 F.2d at 308 (“First, the product or service in question must be one not 
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the 
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current position, the Second Circuit recognized the doctrine of 
nominative fair use without formally adopting a standard.156 
Before Security University, district courts had conceded that 
the Second Circuit had yet to affirm the nominative fair use 
doctrine but continued to apply the Ninth Circuit test anyway, 
citing binding authority from the Second Circuit like Tiffany and 
Chambers in support of the principles.157 Applying the New Kids 
on the Block test had, in reality, become the accepted practice 
among district courts in the Second Circuit.158 Courts had even 
taken the time to compare the Third Circuit standard,159 with the 
Ninth Circuit test and found that “the outcome would be the same 
under either analytical framework.”160 The following subsections 
illustrate the cases underlying (1) the Second Circuit district 
courts’ acceptance of the Ninth Circuit formulation of the 
nominative fair use test and (2) the district courts’ decision not to 
                                                                                                         
mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or 
service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the 
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”). 
 156 Compare Swavrovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 
44, 50 (1st Cir. 2013) (accepting the doctrine of nominative fair use but 
choosing not to adopt a specific standard for analysis), with Tiffany (NJ), 600 
F.3d at 102–103 (recognizing the doctrine of nominative fair use and the district 
court’s application of the New Kids on the Block test but choosing not to adopt 
the test in this case). 
 157 Car–Freshner Corp. v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 167, 177 
(N.D.N.Y. 2011) (“However, a number of district courts within the Second 
Circuit have applied this doctrine when considering claims of trademark 
infringement . . . As a result, the Court assumes, for purposes of deciding the 
instant motion, that the doctrine is applicable.”) (internal citations omitted); see 
also Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 102. 
 158 Audi AG v. Shokan Coachworks, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 246, 269 
(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing case law that suggests “all have followed the standard 
set forth by the Ninth Circuit in New Kids”). 
 159 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217–24 
(3d Cir. 2005) (using nominative fair use as an affirmative defense, requiring a 
likelihood of confusion inquiry, shifting the burden to the defendant to show 
nominative fair use). 
 160 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (remanded for additional 
findings of fact). 
60 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 33 
adopt the Third Circuit’s standard because the Third Circuit 
generally misinterprets the doctrine. 
1. District Courts Accepting the Ninth Circuit Formulation 
Prior to Security University, district courts had accepted the 
Second Circuit’s refusal to adopt or reject the Ninth Circuit 
nominative fair use test.161 But because the Second Circuit had 
implicitly affirmed the application of the test, district courts 
operated under the assumption that the doctrine was applicable and 
the Ninth Circuit test was the proper standard.162 For example, in 
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc,163 Tiffany sued eBay for trademark 
infringement because eBay advertised selling Tiffany jewelry on 
its website, but some of the sellers were offering counterfeit 
jewelry.164 eBay asserted that its use of the Tiffany trademark in 
advertising on its homepage and through sponsored links on 
Yahoo! and Google constituted nominative fair use.165 The district 
court agreed with eBay.166 
In its analysis, the district court used the three-part test as 
stated in New Kids on the Block167 and found that “eBay’s use of 
the Tiffany’s marks was protected under the nominative fair use 
doctrine.”168 On appeal, the Second Circuit described nominative 
fair use as allowing “[a] defendant [to] use a plaintiff’s trademark 
to identify the plaintiff’s goods so long as there is no likelihood of 
confusion about the source of [the] defendant’s product or the 
mark-holder’s sponsorship or affiliation.”169 The appellate court 
also laid out the test as stated by the Ninth Circuit.170 However, the 
                                                
 161 Car-Freshner, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 177. 
 162 Id. (citing Chambers v. Time Warner). 
 163 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 164 Tiffany (NJ), 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
 168 Tiffany (NJ), 576 F. Supp. 2d at 496. 
 169 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 170 Id. at 102. 
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court ultimately held that it “need not address the viability of the 
doctrine to resolve Tiffany’s claim” because the Second Circuit 
had already “recognized that a defendant may lawfully use a 
plaintiff’s trademark where doing so is necessary to describe the 
plaintiff’s product and does not imply a false affiliation or 
endorsement by the plaintiff of the defendant.”171 
2. The Third Circuit’s Approach Misinterprets the Doctrine 
The Third Circuit’s decision to treat nominative fair use as an 
affirmative defense was based on the Supreme Court’s holding in 
KP Permanent that non-owners may use a trademarked word as a 
descriptive term for the non-owner’s own product or service.172 
Although the Third Circuit intended to follow the lead of the 
Supreme Court in making nominative fair use an affirmative 
defense, the context of the use in KP Permanent does not fit with 
nominative fair use.173 The Supreme Court was interpreting a 
provision of the Lanham Act that makes a non-source-identifying 
use of another’s mark to describe the defendant’s own product or 
service a fair use.174 However, a nominative use employs the mark 
for its source identifying purpose, referring to the owner’s product 
                                                
 171 Compare Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 102–03 (“We have recognized that a 
defendant may lawfully use a plaintiff’s trademark where doing so is necessary 
to describe the plaintiff’s product and does not imply a false affiliation or 
endorsement by the plaintiff of the defendant.”), with New Kids on the Block, 
971 F.2d at 308 (“First, the product or service in question must be one not 
readily identifiable without the use of the trademark; second, only so much of 
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the 
product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in 
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the 
trademark holder.”) (emphasis added). 
 172 KP Permanent Make–Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118–
20 (2004). 
 173 See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 
823 F.3d 153, 167 (2d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
KP Permanent as it applied fair use according to the Lanham Act from 
nominative fair use, arguing that the latter falls outside the Lanham Act). But see 
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 
2005) (equating descriptive fair use, in which the defendant does not use the 
mark for source identification, with nominative fair use, in which the defendant 
uses the mark to refer to the plaintiff). 
 174 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 118–20. 
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or service.175 Moreover, Congress enumerated several affirmative 
defenses to trademark infringement in the Lanham Act, including 
classic fair use, but did not include nominative fair use.176 Using 
the language of the statute, decisions from other circuits, and letter 
briefs from the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
indicating its position on the nominative fair use doctrine, the 
Second Circuit properly inferred that “[i]f Congress had wanted 
nominative fair use to constitute an additional affirmative defense, 
it would have provided as such.”177 Accordingly, the Second 
Circuit rejected the Third Circuit’s decision to treat nominative fair 
use as an affirmative defense.178 
In part, the Third Circuit chose not to replace its likelihood of 
confusion test “in order to distribute the burden of proof 
appropriately between the parties at each stage of the analysis.”179 
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of the Ninth Circuit test was that 
the defendant had the burden to prove nominative fair use without 
requiring the plaintiff to show confusion first.180 The Supreme 
Court “explicitly rejected such a proposition in KP Permanent 
Make-Up.”181 
While some district courts in the Ninth Circuit had assigned the 
burden of proof as the Third Circuit described it, Judge Kozinski, 
again writing for the Ninth Circuit, cleared up the confusion over 
allocating the burden in Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Tabari.182 “A defendant seeking to assert nominative fair use as a 
defense need only show that it used the mark to refer to the 
                                                
 175 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 307–08 (discussing and describing 
where nominative fair use fits in likelihood of confusion analysis). 
 176 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) (naming, among others, descriptive fair 
use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement); see also Sec. Univ., 
823 F.3d at 167 (citing authorities to support the proposition that if Congress 
intended to make nominative fair use an affirmative defense, it could and would 
have in this section of the Lanham Act). 
 177 Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167–68. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 232 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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trademarked good [or service].”183 The court explained that the 
plaintiff is responsible for showing that the defendant’s use of the 
mark was not nominative fair use by showing evidence of 
confusion over sponsorship or endorsement.184 
The nominative fair use test as stated by the Ninth Circuit 
appears to have worked in the Second Circuit until Security 
University.185 The court could have remanded the case for the 
district court’s error of law in considering only source confusion 
for the nominative fair use analysis.186 Such a ruling would have 
resolved the district court’s apparent uncertainty about the 
application of the third element in the Ninth Circuit’s nominative 
fair use test by incorporating the language added by the Third 
Circuit.187 In addition, district courts had a well-developed body of 
cases from the Ninth Circuit applying the New Kids on the Block 
test.188 The Second Circuit should have taken this opportunity to 
formally adopt the standard that its district courts had been using 
                                                
 183 Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 610 F.3d at 1183. 
 184 Id. at 1182 (describing further that the part of this showing includes the 
first two elements of nominative fair use, that the defendant needed to use the 
plaintiff’s mark, and that the defendant only used as much of the mark as was 
necessary for defendant’s purposes). 
 185 See generally, e.g., Car–Freshner Corp. v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 
2d 167 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Audi AG v. Shokan Coachworks, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 
2d 246 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 186 See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 
823 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 187 Id. at 169 (“Additionally, when considering the third nominative fair use 
factor, courts must not, as the district court did here, consider only source 
confusion, but rather must consider confusion regarding affiliation, sponsorship, 
or endorsement by the markholder.”). 
 188 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (“We hold that Forsythe’s use of Mattel’s Barbie qualifies as 
nominative fair use. All three elements weigh in favor of Forsythe. Barbie would 
not be readily identifiable in a photographic work without use of the Barbie 
likeness and figure. Forsythe used only so much as was necessary to make his 
parodic use of Barbie readily identifiable, and it is highly unlikely that any 
reasonable consumer would have believed that Mattel sponsored or was 
affiliated with his work. The district court’s grant of summary judgment to 
Forsythe on Mattel’s trade dress infringement claim was, therefore, proper.”); 
Stevo Design, Inc. v. SBR Mktg. Ltd., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (D. Nev. 
2013). 
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for years and that the Second Circuit itself had implicitly 
approved.189 
B. The Polaroid Factors Do Not Easily Apply to Nominative Fair 
Use Cases 
This subsection discusses (1) how half of the Polaroid factors 
unfairly prejudiced the defendant in the first application of the 
Second Circuit’s nominative fair use test and (2) how the Second 
Circuit should have designed a more efficient, less prejudicial 
nominative fair use test. The Second Circuit has repeatedly held 
that “the Polaroid test is not mechanical,”190 that some factors “are 
a bad fit,” and that the factors “are non-exclusive.”191 However, in 
nominative fair use cases, the Second Circuit still requires district 
courts to review each Polaroid factor deliberately, and if any factor 
does not apply, to explain why.192 
The district court in Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Africa Am. Coffee 
Trading Co. LLC, was the first to apply the new standard.193 
Plaintiff Nespresso, a federally registered trademark, produces 
espresso and coffee machines in addition to the capsules used in its 
machines.194 Defendant Libretto produces espresso capsules to fit 
in Nespresso machines, with a label on the bottom of Libretto’s 
                                                
 189 See Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167 (citing Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 
F.3d 93, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2010)) (“Further, as discussed below we have endorsed 
the principles underlying the nominative fair use doctrine.”). 
 190 See Kelly–Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir. 
2009)). 
 191 Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 168. 
 192 Id. at 160 (citing Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 400 
(2d Cir. 1995)) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the district judge to engage in a 
deliberate review of each factor, and, if a factor is inapplicable to a case, to 
explain why.”). 
 193 No. 15CV5553–LTS, 2016 WL 3162118, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016) 
(noting that this case resulted in a default judgment for the plaintiff because the 
defendant failed to respond to plaintiff’s complaint, making it difficult to fully 
evaluate the effectiveness of the new Second Circuit standard, but the opinion 
still provides insight into how the likelihood of confusion factors do not afford 
the defendant the necessary protection when the defendant has no choice but to 
use the plaintiff’s mark in advertisements and labels). 
 194 Nespresso USA, 2016 WL 3162118 at *1. 
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packaging that reads “Nespresso® compatible” stylized text.195 
This led to Nespresso’s infringement claim, and the court’s 
discussion of the Security University standard.196 As instructed by 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the district judge discussed 
each of the eight Polaroid factors and then applied the nominative 
fair use test.197 
1. Polaroid Factors One through Four Unfairly Weigh in 
Favor of Confusion 
The court reviewed the first two Polaroid factors: (1) the 
strength of the plaintiff’s mark and (2) the similarity of the 
marks.198 The strength of the mark is “concerned with the 
distinctiveness . . . in the eyes of the consuming public.”199 
Nespresso’s mark was federally registered and therefore presumed 
distinctive, giving the first factor to Nespresso by legal 
presumption.200 In discussing the similarity of the marks, the court 
took the time to consider the stylized text of Nespresso’s mark on 
defendant’s text box, the prominence of the mark on the 
packaging, and the modifying word “compatible” used after the 
mark. The court found that the mark was not prominently 
displayed, and the defendant used “compatible” to modify 
“Nespresso.”201 However, the court held that “Libretto’s use of the 
word mark Nespresso which is identical to Nespresso’s own mark, 
thus creates a likelihood of confusion.”202 The court failed to 
indicate how the defendant could have used the plaintiff’s mark to 
tell consumers that its products worked with plaintiff’s espresso 
                                                
 195 Id. at *2. 
 196 Id. at *2. 
 197 Id. at 3–5 (reviewing those factors for which the plaintiff presented 
evidence and still discussing those factors that require proof on both sides of the 
issue, such as defendant’s good or bad faith in adopting the mark and evidence 
of actual confusion, even though the defendant failed to answer and the court 
was deciding on default judgment). 
 198 Id. at *3. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Nespresso USA, 2016 WL 3162118 *3. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
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machine without creating a likelihood of confusion over the 
similarity of the marks.203 
The court also held that the third and fourth Polaroid factors, 
proximity of the products in the marketplace and likelihood of 
Nespresso bridging the gap, weighed in favor of the plaintiff 
Nespresso.204 The products at issue were the exact same in this 
case—espresso capsules that fit Nespresso’s machine.205 “There is 
clear proximity in the marketplace, since both Nespresso and 
Libretto operate in the same market and sell the same type of 
goods,” thus factor three weighs in favor of Nespresso.206 “Because 
the products offered by Nespresso and Libretto are for all intents 
and purposes the same, and the market they operate in is identical, 
there is no gap for Nespresso to bridge,” and factor four weighs in 
favor of Nespresso.207 The defendant found itself behind four 
factors to zero on likelihood of confusion simply because it had to 
refer to the plaintiff’s machine to tell consumers what its product 
did.208 
2. Removing Polaroid Factors from the Nominative Fair Use 
Analysis Would Lead to More Consistent and Correct Results 
The Second Circuit’s decision to include all eight Polaroid 
factors in its nominative fair use test unfairly prejudices potential 
users.209 The Ninth Circuit solved this problem by using the New 
Kids on the Block test to supplant its likelihood of confusion test.210 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that “likelihood of confusion” factors 
that focus “on the similarity of the mark used by the plaintiff and 
the defendant,” would lead to the incorrect conclusion that all 
                                                
 203 See id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Nespresso USA, 2016 WL 3162118, at *3. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 See supra Part IV. Section B.1. 
 210 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th 
Cir. 1992); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
DEC 2016] Handling Nominative Fair Use 67 
nominative uses are confusing.211 Likewise, other circuits have 
addressed the same issue.212 For example, the Fourth Circuit 
asserted that “the application of the traditional multi-factor test is 
difficult because often many of the factors are either unworkable or 
not suited or helpful as indicators of confusion in this context.”213 
Even the Third Circuit, that maintained a two-part inquiry in 
nominative fair use cases, eliminated “those factors used to 
establish confusion in other trademark infringement cases that do 
not ‘fit’ in the nominative use context.”214 In particular, the Third 
Circuit removed consideration of “degree of similarity between the 
owner’s mark and the alleged infringing mark,” and “strength of 
the owner’s mark” because the defendant in a nominative fair use 
case is using the plaintiff’s mark, and consideration of these factors 
would unfairly favor a finding of likelihood of confusion.215 The 
Third Circuit went on to recognize that certain other factors were 
not applicable to the case at bar and set the example for lower 
                                                
 211 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“The three–factor test—with its requirements that the defendant use marks only 
when no descriptive substitute exists, use no more of the mark than necessary, 
and do nothing to suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the mark holder—
better addresses concerns regarding the likelihood of confusion in nominative 
use cases.”). 
 212 See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. 
Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 489 (5th Cir. 2008) (“In order to avail 
oneself of the nominative fair use defense ‘the defendant (1) may only use so 
much of the mark as necessary to identify the product or service and (2) may not 
do anything that suggests affiliation, sponsorship, or endorsement by the 
markholder.’”); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 155 (4th Cir. 
2012); August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“A use of a rival’s mark that does not engender confusion about origin or 
quality is therefore permissible.”). 
 213 See Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 155 (“We have merely attempted to 
highlight the problems inherent in the robotic application of each and every 
factor in a case involving a referential, non-trademark use. Accordingly, the 
district court did not commit reversible error in failing to address every factor.”). 
 214 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
 215 Id. at 224–25. 
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courts by analyzing only those factors which were relevant in the 
plaintiff’s “likelihood of confusion” argument.216 
C. An Untested Eleven-Part Analysis of Nominative Fair Use Is 
Inefficient Because It Causes Repetitive Litigation and 
Requires Time to Develop 
This subsection will explore in greater detail (1) how the 
Polaroid factors analysis followed by the nominative fair use test 
will cause the parties to repeat arguments on the same issues, and 
(2) how developing a new standard will cost parties and courts in 
the Second Circuit time and money. The Second Circuit has fully 
admitted that some Polaroid factors are irrelevant to certain cases 
and that in standard infringement cases, district courts need not 
“slavishly recite the litany of all eight Polaroid factors in each any 
every case.”217 However, in the nominative fair use context, 
Security University requires district courts to discuss each 
individual factor.218 It appears that district courts in the Second 
Circuit are following this instruction, including discussion of the 
strength of the owner’s mark, and the similarity of the marks, 
despite the fact that the defendant is using the plaintiff’s exact 
mark.219 
                                                
 216 Id. at 225–26 (explaining why some factors were irrelevant with the 
purpose of preserving their utility in future cases but directing the lower court to 
examine only the relevant factors). 
 217 Orient Exp. Trading Co. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 842 F.2d 650, 654 
(2d Cir. 1988) (“A district court need only consider sufficient factors to reach 
the ultimate conclusion as to whether or not there is a likelihood of confusion.”). 
 218 Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 
F.3d 153, 168 (2d Cir. 2016) (“When considering a likelihood of confusion in 
nominative fair use cases, in addition to discussing each of the Polaroid factors 
. . . .”). 
 219 Infra Part IV. Section B.; see also 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2016) (“The other type of fair use is 
discussed in this section and is known as a ‘nominative fair use.’ . . . This has 
been labeled a non–confusing “nominative use” because it “names” the real 
owner of the mark.”). 
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1. The Second Circuit’s Longer Analysis Causes Repetitive 
Litigation 
The Third Circuit based its rationale for the bifurcated 
approach to nominative fair use on the Supreme Court’s holding 
that descriptive fair use is an affirmative defense.220 However, the 
Third Circuit failed to recognize that the statutory definition of fair 
use, which makes it an affirmative defense, does not comport with 
nominative fair use.221 Nominative fair use, the use of another’s 
mark to describe the owner’s products or services, employs the 
mark for its trademark purpose: source identification.222 
The Third Circuit also considered a one-sided approach 
incorporating the likelihood of confusion factors and the 
nominative fair use test, but ultimately rejected the idea of 
incorporating additional considerations “into the already lengthy 
ten-part test for confusion.”223 However, the concurring judge 
criticized the majority for its logically inconsistent and “judicially 
unmanageable” standard.224 The majority instructed future courts to 
weigh the “intent of the defendant in adopting the mark” in the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case.225 But, inquiry into the defendant’s 
intent required the court to look at the purpose of the defendant’s 
                                                
 220 See Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 222–23. 
 221 Compare id. (“Classic fair use and nominative fair use are different in 
certain respects, but it is unclear to us why we should ask radically different 
questions when analyzing a defendant’s ability to refer to a plaintiff’s mark in 
the two contexts.”), with 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (“That the use of the name, 
term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark 
. . . .”). 
 222 See generally Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167 (differentiating between using a 
trademarked word descriptively, that is, for non-trademark purposes, and using 
another’s mark as a mark to refer to the owner as the source of the good or 
service). 
 223 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 224. 
 224 Id. at 232–233, 238 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(concurring as to the outcome of the case but dissenting as to the bifurcated 
approach). 
 225 Id. at 240 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority holds that ‘if the court 
finds that the defendant made use of the plaintiff’s mark with the very purpose 
of causing consumers to think the plaintiff endorses or sponsors plaintiff’s good 
or service, then the likelihood that consumers will be confused as to 
endorsement/affiliation is greater.’ Maj. Op. at 226.”). 
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use, the prominence or degree of use, and the truthfulness of the 
use.226 These considerations in the prima facie case are the three 
elements of the affirmative defense.227 On remand, the district court 
would consider “the purpose, prominence, and truthfulness of the 
defendant’s conduct as part of the plaintiff[‘s] likelihood of 
confusion case.”228 Then the district court would “also be required 
to look to the same factors when entertaining the defendant’s 
affirmative defense.”229 Although the majority in Century 21 
intended to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in grouping 
descriptive and nominative fair use as affirmative defenses, “where 
confusion is the central focus on each side, the majority [read] KP 
Permanent to hold that both: 1) defendant bears no burden of 
negating confusion, and 2) defendant bears a burden of negating 
confusion.”230 
The Second Circuit rejected the bifurcated approach taken by 
the Third Circuit in part because of its expected minimal effect on 
the outcome of cases, but more assertively because “[i]f Congress 
had wanted nominative fair use to constitute an additional 
affirmative defense, it would have provided as such.”231 In 
                                                
 226 Id. at 226 (asking whether the defendant’s use in context would “confuse 
the public as to the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff”). 
 227 See id. at 241 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“If the above characterization sounds 
familiar, it should. Each and every one of the majority’s ‘nominative fair use’ 
prongs is nothing more than an inquiry into the likelihood of confusion, 
specifically, whether the use is with the intent to confuse due to a presence or 
lack of good–faith purpose, prominence and truthfulness.”). 
 228 Id. at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 229 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 230 Id. at 246 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 231 See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 
823 F.3d 153, 167 (2d Cir. 2016); see also id. (referring to letter briefs from the 
United States Patent and Trademark office apparently stating that the office does 
not believe nominative fair use should be an affirmative defense; see also 
Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 495 fn.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(noting that the bifurcated approach taken by the Third Circuit would have 
minimal effect on the outcome of cases) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 
(2d Cir. 2010) (remanded for additional findings of fact). But see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(3)(A) (showing that Congress did consider nominative fair use in 
drafting the Lanham Act because under exclusions for dilution claims “[a]ny fair 
use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use” are “not actionable as 
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment”). 
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addition, the Third Circuit approach makes nominative fair use 
protections broader than in the Ninth Circuit where the New Kids 
on the Block test determines the outcome.232 As an affirmative 
defense, nominative fair use allows defendants to succeed even if 
the plaintiff proves the likelihood of confusion, as long as the 
defendant affirmatively answers the Third Circuit’s three 
nominative fair use questions.233 
2. An Unsettled Standard Raises Costs in and out of Court 
In addition to repetitive litigation that wastes judicial 
resources,234 businesses suffer from an unsettled standard in 
nominative fair use because of uncertainty over how the courts will 
apply the new test.235 Because of this uncertainty, potential users 
can (1) pay for a license to use the mark, (2) find a less convenient 
way to inform consumers what their product or service is, or (3) 
assert nominative fair use and risk costly litigation.236 Smaller 
businesses that cannot expend large amounts of money on 
                                                
 232 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th 
ed. 2016) (describing the Third Circuit’s view that nominative fair use as an 
affirmative defense coincides with the Supreme Court’s intent in KP Permanent 
Make–Up). 
 233 See Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 222 (“Under our fairness test, a 
defendant must show; (1) that the use of the plaintiff’s mark is necessary to 
describe both the plaintiff’s product or service and the defendant’s product or 
service; (2) that the defendant uses only so much of the plaintiff’s mark as is 
necessary to describe the plaintiff’s product; and (3) that the defendant’s 
conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship between [the] 
plaintiff and defendant’s products or services.”); see also 4 MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2016). 
 234 See Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting); supra 
Part IV. Section C.1. 
 235 See McGeveran, supra note 34, at 2275–76 (describing the difficulties for 
businesses that do not consistently use others’ marks in their work in 
determining whether the cost of appealing to customers without using the mark 
outweighs potential litigation costs or a license). 
 236 Id. at 2276 (“In addition to the monetary costs of rights clearance and 
licensing, this excessive caution also constrains expressive choices, stifles open 
competition, and reduces the quality of speech and entertainment for its 
consumers–that is, for all of us. But many institutions have determined that the 
potential cost of defending a lawsuit is too high, even when discounted for the 
low likelihood of getting sued and the very low likelihood of paying damages.”). 
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advertisements, lack expertise on trademark law, and lack the 
resources to consult an attorney will often decide to forego use of 
another’s mark even though such use might be legal.237 A short and 
pointed inquiry into nominative fair use, such as that of the Ninth 
Circuit, would make litigation shorter, less expensive, and more 
predictable.238 Attorneys advising small businesses could look to 
the well-developed body of nominative fair use cases from the 
Ninth Circuit, as well as district courts in the Second Circuit.239 
The attorneys could then give recommendations based on 
established law, rather than speculation as to what the courts could 
or should do.240 
Taking the Third Circuit approach would remove some 
unnecessary steps in the Second Circuit’s future inquiries into 
nominative fair use because the Third Circuit asks district courts to 
examine only the relevant factors.241 However, the same approach 
requires courts to consider identical factors, purpose, prominence, 
and truthfulness, in the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the 
defendant’s affirmative defense.242 The Ninth Circuit’s method 
sufficiently covers the likelihood of confusion inquiry, and the 
twenty-four year history of the New Kids on the Block test gives 
courts a substantial body of case law discussing nuances of the 
test.243 Even the Third Circuit considered adopting “the Ninth 
Circuit test outright, as it has withstood the test of time, [and] has 
                                                
 237 Id. at 2277–78. 
 238 See cf. id. at 2278 (standing for the proposition that a statute codifying 
nominative fair use would make litigation shorter, less expensive, and more 
predictable, just as uniformity in application amongst the circuits would). 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225–26 
(cutting the analysis to four likelihood of confusion factors along with the three 
nominative fair use affirmative defense questions). 
 242 Id. at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 243 See generally, e.g., Audi AG v. Shokan Coachworks, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 
246 (citing district court cases that apply only the New Kids on the Block test, 
none of which were appealed); Image Online Design, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for 
Assigned Names & Numbers, No. CV–12–08968–DDP, 2013 WL 489899 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 7, 2013) (addressing certification marks); Swarovski 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(discussing service marks and endorsement or affiliation confusion). 
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been tinkered with in no less than seven opinions.”244 The three-
part test keeps the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion as to 
source, sponsorship, or endorsement.245 Moreover, it keeps the 
defendant’s interest in fair competition at the forefront of the 
discussion by looking at whether the defendant’s product or 
service is “readily identifiable without the use of the mark,” and 
whether the defendant used only so much of the mark “as is 
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service.”246 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit should not have incorporated the doctrine 
of nominative fair use as it did in Security University. Instead, it 
should have adopted the Ninth Circuit test initially created in New 
Kids on the Block for three reasons: (1) district courts had been 
successfully using the Ninth Circuit test, (2) the non-exclusive 
Polaroid factors do not easily apply to nominative fair use, and (3) 
an eleven-part analysis of nominative fair use is a waste of judicial 
resources. The Second Circuit’s acknowledgment of the New Kids 
on the Block test247 and apparent acquiescence to the district courts’ 
application of the doctrine of nominative fair use,248 gave the court 
the opportunity to adopt the test wholesale in Security 
University.249 The Third Circuit’s affirmative defense approach 
would allow the Second Circuit to hold on to the Polaroid factors 
in a more efficient manner than the Security University standard 
does now because the Third Circuit allows courts to focus on 
                                                
 244 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 228. 
 245 See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1182–83 
(9th Cir. 2010) (clarifying the position of the Ninth Circuit as to the burden 
shifting of the nominative fair use test, placing on the defendant only the burden 
of showing “that it used the mark to refer to the trademarked good [or service]”). 
 246 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 
(9th Cir. 1992) (laying out the nominative fair use factors). 
 247 Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 248 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102—03 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 249 Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 
F.3d 153, 168 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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relevant factors in determining the likelihood of confusion250 rather 
than requiring discussion of each likelihood of confusion factor.251 
However, adopting the Third Circuit approach while rejecting 
nominative fair use as an affirmative defense would be only a 
slight improvement on the Second Circuit’s current standard.252 
The Ninth Circuit developed its test and replaced its version of the 
Polaroid factors to avoid repetitive litigation and better address 
nominative uses in context rather than mechanically applying inapt 
factors.253 Finally, the eleven-part analysis required for nominative 
fair use claims requires district court judges to review factors—
principally, strength of the mark and similarity of the marks—that 
unfairly impact a defendant claiming nominative fair use when the 
original purpose of trademark law is to prevent unfair competition 
rather than create an unlimited property right.254 If the Supreme 
Court grants Security University’s petition for a writ of certiorari, 
the Court should adopt the Ninth Circuit test as the proper analysis 
for nominative fair use. 
                                                
 250 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225–26 
(explaining why some factors were irrelevant with the purpose of preserving 
their utility in future cases but directing the lower court to examine only the 
relevant factors). 
 251 Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 168 (When considering a likelihood of confusion in 
nominative fair use cases, in addition to discussing each of the Polaroid factors 
. . . .”). 
 252 See id., 823 F.3d at 168; see also Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Africa Am. 
Coffee Trading Co. LLC, No. 15CV5553–LTS, 2016 WL 3162118, at *1, *2–4 
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016); Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 225–26. 
 253 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the New Kids on the Block test will replace the likelihood of 
confusion factors in nominative fair use cases); see also Century 21 Real Estate, 
425 F.3d at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (arguing that the same issues will be 
discussed on both sides of the case). 
 254 Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 225–26; see also KP Permanent 
Make–Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (granting fair use as a 
defense to trademark infringement). 
